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WHERE THE WILD THINGS ARE…PROPERLY VALUED: A LOOK
INTO METHODS USED BY COURTS TO ASSIGN MONETARY
VALUE TO WILDLIFE
United States v. Bertucci, 794 F.3d 925 (8th Cir. 2015).
I. INTRODUCTION
Section 2Q2.1 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines, guides
courts in sentencing when the offense involves wildlife.1 In recent years,
courts have interpreted and applied § 2Q2.1 inconsistently in the
assignment of monetary value to wildlife for sentencing. Different
methods of valuing wildlife have included: strict application of valuation
tables created by the United States Fish and Wildlife Service, 2 use of the
offender’s intended profit from the illegal sale of the wildlife,3 use of
testimony from experts in wildlife rehabilitation,4 and use of taxidermist
estimations of the costs of acquisition, scientific value and rarity of the
wildlife involved.5

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2Q2.1 (2015).
See U.S. v. Bertucci, 794 F.3d 925 (8th Cir. 2015).
3
See U.S. v. Oehlenschlager, 76 F.3d 227 (8th Cir. 1996).
4
See Bertucci, 794 F.3d at 925 (8th Cir. 2015).
5
See U.S. v. Asper, 753 F. Supp. 1260 (M.D. Pa. 1990).
1
2
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This note will focus on the implications of the recent Bertucci
decision and whether this decision is reflective of the protection and
preservation of the Midwest’s environment. The issues in Bertucci raise
interesting questions as to how the country currently values, and how it
should value, its wildlife.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
In 2014, Lamar Bertucci plead guilty to the shooting and killing of
a bald eagle and a rough-legged hawk in violation of 16 U.S.C. §§ 668(a),
6

707, 7 and 707.8 After Bertucci plead guilty, the district court ordered the

6

16 U.S.C. §668(a) (2012):
(a) Prohibited acts; criminal penalties:
Whoever, within the United States or any place subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, without being permitted to do so as provided in this
subchapter, shall knowingly, or with wanton disregard for the
consequences of his act take, possess, sell, purchase, barter, offer to
sell, purchase or barter, transport, export or import, at any time or in
any manner, any bald eagle commonly known as the American eagle,
or any golden eagle, alive or dead, or any part, nest, or egg thereof of
the foregoing eagles, or whoever violates any permit or regulation
issued pursuant to this subchapter, shall be fined not more than $5,000
or imprisoned not more than one year or both: Provided, That in the
case of a second or subsequent conviction for a violation of this section
committed after October 23, 1972, such person shall be fined not more
than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than two years, or both: Provided
further, That the commission of each taking or other act prohibited by
this section with respect to a bald or golden eagle shall constitute a
separate violation of this section: Provided further, That one-half of
any such fine, but not to exceed $2,500, shall be paid to the person or
persons giving information which leads to conviction: Provided
further, That nothing herein shall be construed to prohibit possession or
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transportation of any bald eagle, alive or dead, or any part, nest, or egg
thereof, lawfully taken prior to June 8, 1940, and that nothing herein
shall be construed to prohibit possession or transportation of any
golden eagle, alive or dead, or any part, nest, or egg thereof, lawfully
taken prior to the addition to this subchapter of the provisions relating
to preservation of the golden eagle. Id.
7
§ 703(a):
(a) In general
Unless and except as permitted by regulations made as hereinafter
provided in this subchapter, it shall be unlawful at any time, by any
means or in any manner, to pursue, hunt, take, capture, kill, attempt to
take, capture, or kill, possess, offer for sale, sell, offer to barter, barter,
offer to purchase, purchase, deliver for shipment, ship, export, import,
cause to be shipped, exported, or imported, deliver for transportation,
transport or cause to be transported, carry or cause to be carried, or
receive for shipment, transportation, carriage, or export, any migratory
bird, any part, nest, or egg of any such bird, or any product, whether or
not manufactured, which consists, or is composed in whole or part, of
any such bird or any part, nest, or egg thereof, included in the terms of
the conventions between the United States and Great Britain for the
protection of migratory birds concluded August 16, 1916 (39 Stat.
1702), the United States and the United Mexican States for the
protection of migratory birds and game mammals concluded February
7, 1936, the United States and the Government of Japan for the
protection of migratory birds and birds in danger of extinction, and
their environment concluded March 4, 19721 and the convention
between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
for the conservation of migratory birds and their environments
concluded November 19, 1976. . . Id.
8
§ 707:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, any person,
association, partnership, or corporation who shall violate any
provisions of said conventions or of this subchapter, or who shall
violate or fail to comply with any regulation made pursuant to this
subchapter shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and upon
conviction thereof shall be fined not more than $15,000 or be
imprisoned not more than six months, or both.
(b) Whoever, in violation of this subchapter, shall knowingly-(1) take by any manner whatsoever any migratory bird with intent to
sell, offer to sell, barter or offer to barter such bird, or
(2) sell, offer for sale, barter or offer to barter, any migratory bird shall
be guilty of a felony and shall be fined not more than $2,000 or
imprisoned not more than two years, or both.
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preparation of a presentence investigation report (“PSR”).9 The PSR found
that Bertucci had a criminal history score of two and that his total offense
level was ten.10 The PSR incorporated a four-level enhancement on the
basis that the total “loss” amounts for the eagle and hawk exceeded
$10,000, but did not exceed $30,000.11 The PSR also included a two-level
enhancement for a “pattern of similar violations” because of Bertucci’s
previous conviction for possession of bald eagle feathers, in violations of §
668(a).12 The PSR also included several paragraphs focusing on alleged
(c) Whoever violates section 704(b)(2) of this title shall be fined under
Title 18, imprisoned not more than 1 year, or both.
(d) All guns, traps, nets and other equipment, vessels, vehicles, and
other means of transportation used by any person when engaged in
pursuing, hunting, taking, trapping, ensnaring, capturing, killing, or
attempting to take, capture, or kill any migratory bird in violation of
this subchapter with the intent to offer for sale, or sell, or offer for
barter, or barter such bird in violation of this subchapter shall be
forfeited to the United States and may be seized and held pending the
prosecution of any person arrested for violating this subchapter and
upon conviction for such violation, such forfeiture shall be adjudicated
as a penalty in addition to any other provided for violation of this
subchapter. Such forfeited property shall be disposed of and accounted
for by, and under the authority of, the Secretary of the Interior. Id.
Bertucci, 794 F.3d at 926.
9
Bertucci, 794 F.3d at 926.
10
Id.
11
Id. at 926-27.
12
Id. at 927 (citing 16 U.S.C.S. § 668 (2015)); 16 U.S.C.S. § 668:
(a) Prohibited acts; criminal penalties. Whoever, within the United
States or any place subject to the jurisdiction thereof, without being
permitted to do so as hereinafter provided, shall knowingly, or with
wanton disregard for the consequences of his act take, possess, sell,
purchase, barter, offer to sell, purchase or barter, transport, export or
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previous assaults committed by Bertucci.13 Bertucci objected to both
sentence level enhancements and to the allegations of assault. 14 The
district court denied the objections and sentenced Bertucci to eight
months’ imprisonment with one year of supervised release along with a
$6,500 “financial obligation,”15 and mandatory anger-management
counseling.16 The Defendant argued on appeal that the court committed

import, at any time or in any manner, any bald eagle commonly known
as the American eagle, or any golden eagle, alive or dead, or any part,
nest, or egg thereof of the foregoing eagles, or whoever violates any
permit or regulation issued pursuant to this Act [16 USCS §§ 668668d], shall be fined not more than $ 5,000 or imprisoned not more
than one year or both: Provided, That in the case of a second or
subsequent conviction for a violation of this section committed after the
date of the enactment of this proviso [Oct. 23, 1972], such person shall
be fined not more than $ 10,000 or imprisoned not more than two years,
or both: Provided further, That the commission of each taking or other
act prohibited by this section with respect to a bald or golden eagle
shall constitute a separate violation of this section: Provided
further, That one-half of any such fine, but not exceed $ 2,500, shall be
paid to the person or persons giving information which leads to
conviction: Provided further, That nothing herein shall be construed to
prohibit possession or transportation of any bald eagle, alive or dead, or
any part, nest, or egg thereof, lawfully taken prior to June 8, 1940, and
that nothing herein shall be construed to prohibit possession or
transportation of any golden eagle, alive or dead, or any part, nest, or
egg thereof, lawfully taken prior to the addition to this Act [16 USCS
§§ 668-668d] of the provisions relating to preservation of the golden
eagle. Id.
13
Bertucci, 794 F.3d at 927.
14
Id.
15
Id. at 926 (unclear if district court meant for the “financial obligation” to be restitution
or fine).
16
Id. at 932-33. The court ultimately decided that the district court abused its discretion
by requiring anger-management counseling. Id.
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multiple procedural errors with respect to its application of the Sentencing
Guidelines, in that the sentence level was, in part, based on an incorrect
monetary valuation of the birds.17 Bertucci also argued that court lacked
the authority to order restitution and that the court had insufficient factual
basis to require anger-management counseling.18
Bertucci’s sentence level, in accordance with Sentencing
Guidelines §§ 2Q2.1 (b) (3) (A) (ii),19 and 2B1.1 (b) (1) (C),20 was based
on replacement costs21 of $10,000 and $1,750 for the eagle and hawk,
Id. at 927.
Id.
19
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2Q2.1 (2015).
Offenses Involving Fish, Wildlife, and Plants:
If the offense (A) involved fish, wildlife, or plants that were not
quarantined as required by law; or (B) otherwise created a significant
risk of infestation or disease transmission potentially harmful to
humans, fish, wildlife, or plants increase by 2 levels.
(3) (If more than one applies, use the greater):
(A) If the market value of the fish, wildlife, or plants (i) exceeded
$2,000 but did not exceed $5,000, increase by 1 level; or (ii) exceeded
$5,000, increase by the number of levels from the table in § 2B1.1
(Theft, Property Destruction, and Fraud) corresponding to that amount.
Id.
20
§ 2B1.1.
21
§ 2Q2.1:
When information is reasonably available, “market value” under
subsection (b)(3)(A) shall be based on the fair-market retail price.
Where the fair-market retail price is difficult to ascertain, the court may
make a reasonable estimate using any reliable information, such as the
reasonable replacement or restitution cost or the acquisition and
preservation (e.g., taxidermy) cost. Market value, however, shall not be
based on measurement of aesthetic loss (so called “contingent
valuation” methods). Id.(emphasis added).
17
18
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respectively.22 Bertucci argued that the district court erred by adopting “a
flawed valuation process” to value the eagle and hawk.23 Bertucci, in
support of his argument, noted, “that both the government and the district
court had adopted a mere $2,000 valuation for bald eagles in the 2009
prosecutions of both him and his brother.”24 Instead of relying on a
valuation table prepared by the United States Fish and Wildlife Service,25
which was previously applied by this court in the 2009 prosecution of
Bertucci, the court relied on valuations from an affidavit of Edward Clark
Jr., President of the Wildlife Center of Virginia. 26 Clark’s valuations were
significantly higher than the valuations that the court had previously
adopted.

27

The district court imposed a “financial obligation” of $5,000

for the eagle in addition to $1,500 for the hawk, which was consistent with
Clark’s valuations.28

Bertucci, 794 F.3d at 927.
Id.
24
Id. See U.S. v. Bertucci, No. 8:09CR84, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119230 (D. Neb. Nov.
25, 2009).
25
In Re: Forfeiture of Collateral Schedule—United States Fish and Wildlife Service,
General Order No. 96-13 (E. Tex. June 19, 1996).
26
Bertucci, 794 F.3d at 928.
27
Id.
28
Id. at 927.
22
23
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On Appeal, the court vacated the district court’s sentence and
remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion,
finding that Clark’s valuations did “not constitute reliable evidence to
justify the new and dramatically increased eagle and hawk valuations
proffered.”29 Citing the Guidelines, the appellate court reasoned that when
deciding wildlife valuations for sentencing, where fair-market price is
difficult to ascertain, the court must only consider reliable information that
is consistent with previous valuations or reliable information that justifies
new valuations.30 In determining the reliability of Clark’s valuations, the
court critically viewed Clark’s consideration of policy issues 31 and the fact
that much of the information contained in Clark’s analysis was derived
from conversations with third parties, some of which occurred decades
ago, making it impossible to discern the reliability of the information.32
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The United States Sentencing Commission (the “Commission”) is
an independent agency in the judicial branch that exists to establish

Id. at 929, 932.
Id.
31
Id. at 929.
32
Id.
29
30
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sentencing policies and practices for the federal criminal justice system to
ensure ends of justice by promulgating detailed guidelines prescribing the
appropriate sentences for offenders convicted of federal crimes.33 The
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (the “Act”) delegates broad authority to
the Commission to review and set standards for the federal sentencing
process.34 The Act contains “detailed instructions as to how this
determination should be made, the most important of which directs the
Commission to create categories of offense behavior and offender
characteristics.”35 The Commission prescribes guideline ranges specifying
appropriate sentences for each class of convicted persons which are
determined by coordinating the offense behavior categories with offender
characteristic categories.36 Offense behavior categories typically describe
details of the crime committed, whereas offender characteristic categories
typically include details specific to the offender.37 For example, an offense
behavior category may state “bank robbery/committed with a gun/$2500
taken,” and an offender characteristic category may state, “offender with
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A(1) (2015).
Id. at pt. A(1)(2).
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
Id.
33
34
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one prior conviction not resulting in imprisonment.”38 The nature of what
is included in these categories can result in statutory sentence
enhancements or adjustments.39 In regards to crimes involving wildlife,
there are sentence enhancements, for example, based on the value of the
wildlife involved in the offense and the offender’s criminal history. 40 The
sentencing court must select a sentence from within the prescribed
guideline range.41 However, if a particular case presents atypical features,
the court is allowed to depart from the Guidelines’ prescribed sentence
range, so long as the court specifies in writing its reasoning.42
The Sentencing Guidelines went into effect November 1, 1987.43
Shortly after the implementation of the Guidelines, defendants began
challenging the constitutionality of the Guidelines on the bases of
improper legislative delegation and violation of the separation of powers
doctrine.44 In Mistretta v. United States,45 the Supreme Court rejected

Id.
Id.
40
Id. See In Re: Forfeiture of Collateral Schedule—United States Fish and Wildlife
Service, General Order No. 96-13 (E. Tex. June 19, 1996).
41
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A(1) (2015).
42
Id.
43
Office of Legislative and Public Affairs, An Overview of the United States Sentencing
Commission 2, http://isb.ussc.gov/files/USSC_Overview.pdf (last visited Nov. 29, 2015).
44
Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 361.
38
39
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these challenges.46 The Court upheld the constitutionality of the
Commission as a judicial branch agency, 47 finding that Congress did not
delegate excessive legislative power or upset the constitutionallymandated balance of powers among the coordinate branches of
government.48 Since their implementation in 1989, federal judges have
sentenced more than a million defendants using the Guidelines.49
According to the Sentencing Guidelines, the base offense level for
offenses involving fish, wildlife, or plants is six.50 In the Bertucci case, the
presentence investigation report (“PSR”) concluded that Bertucci had a
criminal history score of two and incorporated a four-level enhancement
under the Sentencing Guidelines because the “total ‘loss’ amounts for the
eagle and hawk exceeded $10,000 but did not exceed $30,000.”51 The PSR
also incorporated a two-level enhancement for Bertucci’s pattern of
similar violations because of his 2009 conviction52 for possession of bald

Mistretta v. U.S., 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
Office of Legislative and Public Affairs, supra note 43, at 2; Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 361.
47
Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 361.
48
Id.
49
Office of Legislative and Public Affairs, supra note 43, at 2.
50
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2Q2.1 (2015).
51
U.S. v. Bertucci, 794 F.3d 925, 926 (8th Cir. 2015).
52
Id. See U.S. v. Bertucci, No. 8:09CR84, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119230 (D. Neb. Nov.
25, 2009).
45
46
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eagle feathers.53 With the statutory enhancements based on his criminal
history and the value of the “total loss” resulting from his offense,
Bertucci’s total offense level was ten.54 The enhancements are important
in this case because if the court had used the $2,000 valuation for the
harmed wildlife that the state and the district court had used in Bertucci’s
previous 2009 prosecution,55 his offense sentence level, and thus, his
ultimate sentence would have been less.56
In regards to the “market value” of wildlife, the Sentencing
Guidelines are clear that “when information is reasonably available,
‘market value’. . . shall be based on the fair-market retail price.”57 Where
the fair-market retail price is difficult to ascertain, the court may make a
reasonable estimate using any reliable information, such as the reasonable
replacement or restitution cost or the acquisition and preservation (e.g.,
taxidermy) cost.”58 Bertucci is centered around the question of what
counts as reliable information for a reasonable estimate.59
Bertucci, 794 F.3d at 927.
Id. at 926.
55
Id.
56
Id. at 928.
57
Id. (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2Q2.1 cmt. n. 4 (2015)).
58
Id. (emphasis added).
59
Id.
53
54
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In United States v. Oehlenschlager,60 the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals, similar to the Bertucci case, was tasked with determining a “fairmarket retail price” of wildlife.61 The defendant, Oehlenschlager, plead
guilty to illegally importing wildlife and aiding and abetting the illegal
importation of wildlife in foreign commerce.62 In Oehlenschlager, the
defendant illegally imported “36 White-Winged Scoter eggs, 100
American Goldeneye eggs, 13 Red-breasted Merganser eggs, 50 Common
Merganser eggs, and 1 Sandhill Crane.”63 The government argued the
value of the eggs was established by the value of the adult version of the
respective species.64 For these values, the government referred to the
defendant’s own price list for resale, which valued adult ducks at over
$50,000.”65 Giving the eggs the adult value would have enhanced the
offense level by five points according to the Guidelines.66 The defendant
argued that this method of valuation would be unfair due to high egg

U.S. v. Oehlenschlager, 76 F.3d 227 (8th Cir. 1996).
Id. at 229.
62
Id. at 228.
63
Id.
64
Id. at 229.
65
Id. at 230.
66
Id. at 229 (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2F1.1(b)(F) (2015)).
60
61
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mortality rates.67 The court was not persuaded by this argument.68 Rather,
the court found it reasonable to value illegally imported water bird eggs,
for which there was no reasonably available market price, as the value that
defendant himself placed on the live birds, i.e. the profits that he intended
to realize from his illegal activity.

69

The court utilized the defendant’s

price list for the wildlife rather than the valuation table prepared by the
United States Fish and Wildlife Services used in Bertucci.
Additionally, in United States v. Asper,70 Paul Asper was charged
under the Endangered Species Act of 1973, Title 16, United States Code,
§§ 1531-1543,71 and Title 18, United States Code, § 545,72 and 2.7374
Id.
Id. at 230.
69
Id.
70
U.S. v. Asper, 753 F. Supp. 1260 (M.D. Pa. 1990).
71
16 U.S.C.S. § 1531 (2015):
(a) Findings. The Congress finds and declares that-(1) various species of fish, wildlife, and plants in the United States
have been rendered extinct as a consequence of economic growth and
development untempered by adequate concern and conservation;
(2) other species of fish, wildlife, and plants have been so depleted in
numbers that they are in danger of or threatened with extinction;
(3) these species of fish, wildlife, and plants are of esthetic, ecological,
educational, historical, recreational, and scientific value to the Nation
and its people;
(4) the United States has pledged itself as a sovereign state in the
international community to conserve to the extent practicable the
various species of fish or wildlife and plants facing extinction, pursuant
to-(A) migratory bird treaties with Canada and Mexico;
67
68
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Asper was charged for the unlawful possession of animal body parts under
16 U.S.C. § 1538(c)(1) and 1504(b)(1).75 Six species of wildlife involving
nine animals were the subjects of the charges.7677 The District Court of
(B) the Migratory and Endangered Bird Treaty with Japan;
(C) the Convention on Nature Protection and Wildlife Preservation in
the Western Hemisphere;
(D) the International Convention for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries;
(E) the International Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of the
North Pacific Ocean;
(F) the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of
Wild Fauna and Flora; and
(G) other international agreements; and
(5) encouraging the States and other interested parties, through Federal
financial assistance and a system of incentives, to develop and maintain
conservation programs which meet national and international standards
is a key to meeting the Nation's international commitments and to
better safeguarding, for the benefit of all citizens, the Nation's heritage.
Id.
72
18 U.S.C. § 545 (2012) provides in part:
Whoever knowingly and willfully, with intent to defraud the United
States, smuggles, or clandestinely introduces into the United States any
merchandise which should have been invoiced. . . .Whoever
fraudulently or knowingly imports or brings into the United States, any
merchandise contrary to law, or receives, conceals, buys, sells or in any
manner facilitates the transportation, concealment, or sale of such
merchandise after importation, knowing the same to have been
imported or brought into the United states contrary to law. . .[S]hall be
fined not more than $ 10,000 or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or
both. Id.
73
18 U.S.C. § 2 (2012) provides:
(a) Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids,
abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is
punishable as a principal.
(b) Whoever willfully causes an act to be done which if directly
performed by him or another would be an offense against the United
States, is punishable as a principal. Id.
74
Asper, 753 F. Supp. at 1263.
75
Id.
76
Id.
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Pennsylvania found that “where market value is difficult to ascertain, a
district court may use a reasonable method to measure loss . . . and is not
limited to a strict market valuation of loss.”78 Further, the court found that
when determining the market value of wildlife, when there is no legal
market for endangered wildlife, the court may consider the appraisal of
taxidermists, based on the cost of replacement and acquisition of the
wildlife and other data.79 The court in Asper, considered the testimony of a
curator at the Carnegie Museum credible in regards to the effect the
killings had on the world population of the wildlife.80 Four witnesses also
testified regarding the value of wildlife: an experienced auctioneer, an
appraiser, and two taxidermists.81 The court considered factors such as the
cost of acquisition or replacement, profit, scientific value, artistic value,
and rarity when determining valuations.82 Ultimately, the court utilized a

77
Id. The animals involved, included: Serows, a Jentink’s Duiker, a Black-faced Impala,
an African Wild Dog, Gorals, and Huemuls. Id.
78
Id. at 1281.
79
Id. at 1281-82.
80
Id. at 1282.
81
Id. at 1270.
82
Id.
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valuation based on cost of acquisition, scientific value, and rarity
persuasive, adjusting the taxidermist’s values as the court saw fit.83
In another factually similar case,

United States v. Ross,84 the

defendant was found guilty on four counts of aiding and abetting in the
unlawful taking of various species of hawks under 16 U.S.C. §§ 70385 and
707(a).8687 Sixteen hawk remains were recovered from a garbage dump on

Id. at 1282.
U.S. v. Ross, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146285 (D.S.D. Oct. 10, 2012).
85
16 U.S.C. § 703(a) (2012):
(a) In general
Unless and except as permitted by regulations made as hereinafter
provided in this subchapter, it shall be unlawful at any time, by any
means or in any manner, to pursue, hunt, take, capture, kill, attempt to
take, capture, or kill, possess, offer for sale, sell, offer to barter, barter,
offer to purchase, purchase, deliver for shipment, ship, export, import,
cause to be shipped, exported, or imported, deliver for transportation,
transport or cause to be transported, carry or cause to be carried, or
receive for shipment, transportation, carriage, or export, any migratory
bird, any part, nest, or egg of any such bird, or any product, whether or
not manufactured, which consists, or is composed in whole or part, of
any such bird or any part, nest, or egg thereof, included in the terms of
the conventions between the United States and Great Britain for the
protection of migratory birds concluded August 16, 1916 (39 Stat.
1702), the United States and the United Mexican States for the
protection of migratory birds and game mammals concluded February
7, 1936, the United States and the Government of Japan for the
protection of migratory birds and birds in danger of extinction, and
their environment concluded March 4, 1972 and the convention
between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
for the conservation of migratory birds and their environments
concluded November 19, 1976. Id.
86
§ 707(a):
Except as otherwise provided in this section, any person, association,
partnership, or corporation who shall violate any provisions of said
83
84
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the defendant’s property in addition to feather fragments at another site on
his property.88 The court reasoned that determining the value of each hawk
would be “difficult, if not impossible, because federal law makes it
unlawful to sell, barter, purchase, ship, import, export, deliver, or transport
hawks,” meaning, there is no marketplace, and thus no market value, for
them.89 The court utilized the determinations reached by another court in
the district which fixed the value of hawks at $1,750.90 The court found
“the testimony of Edward Clark, who appeared as an expert witness in
another Migratory Bird Treaty Act case, is also instructive. In that case,
the presiding District Judge found Mr. Clark's valuation opinions to be
both credible and reliable.”91 The Ross court agreed with the other judge’s
findings and adopted Clark’s valuations.92 Ultimately, the court ordered

conventions or of this subchapter, or who shall violate or fail to comply
with any regulation made pursuant to this subchapter shall be deemed
guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof shall be fined not
more than $15,000 or be imprisoned not more than six months, or both.
Id.
87
Ross, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146285, at *1 (D.S.D. Oct. 10, 2012).
88
Id. at *13-14.
89
Id. at *14.
90
Id. at *14-15.
91
Id. at *15.
92
Id.
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the defendant to pay Clark’s valuation of $1,750 per hawk for a total
restitution amount of $28,000.93
IV. INSTANT DECISION
In the instant case, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit found the trial court erred in applying § 2Q2.1,94 finding
that Clark’s valuations from the affidavit did not constitute sufficiently
reliable evidence to justify the new and increased eagle and hawk
valuations.95 Finding the defendant’s argument persuasive, the court noted
that “the District of Nebraska (the district court in this case) has
specifically adopted the Valuation Table96 to establish the replacement
Id. at *16.
Critically, with respect to the "market value" of the wildlife, Application Note 4 to §
2Q2.1 clarifies that:
When information is reasonably available, "market value" . . . shall be
based on the fair-market retail price. Where the fair-market retail price
is difficult to ascertain, the court may make a reasonable estimate using
any reliable information, such as the reasonable replacement or
restitution cost or the acquisition and preservation (e.g., taxidermy)
cost.
(Emphasis added.) Thus, even assuming there was no "reasonably
available" information to determine the "fair-market retail price" of the
bald eagle and rough-legged hawk (which the district court implicitly
found), substitute estimates must nevertheless be "reasonable" and
based on "reliable information." With this procedural safeguard in
mind, we now analyze the reliability of the valuation-related evidence
in the record before us.
U.S. v. Bertucci, 794 F.3d 925, 928 (8th Cir. 2015).
95
Id. at 929.
96
In Re: Forfeiture of Collateral Schedule—United States Fish and Wildlife Service,
93
94
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values of various types of birds — including eagles and hawks.”97 The
court found the state failed to prove how the value of an eagle quintupled
between 2009, when the court used the Valuation Table’s $2,000
valuation, and 2014, when the government asked the court to use Clark’s
valuation of $10,000.98 The court further emphasized the testimony of a
United States Fish and Wildlife Service special agent who testified that
“bald eagles were recently taken off the endangered species list”99 and that
it would be proper to “assume that their populations are growing,” making
the point that increased endangered-ness could not be the reasoning behind
the increase in value.100
Further, the court also found Clark’s affidavit to contain
weaknesses which, according to the court, cast doubt on the affidavit’s
reliability.101 For instance, the court noted that the affidavit suggested
Clark may have structured his analysis and high valuations to comport
with his own beliefs that a bird’s replacement value should be deemed to

General Order No. 96-13 (E. Tex. June 19, 1996).
97
Bertucci, 794 F.3d at 928.
98
Id.
99
Id.
100
Id.
101
Id.
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exceed the bird’s average rehabilitation costs as a legal policy matter.102
The court noted that although Clark may be correct in his conclusion that
ensuring replacement costs exceed average rehabilitation costs constitutes
good legal policy, Clark’s “proper role in submitting the affidavit was
limited to assessing the true valuations of the birds per the Guidelines and
not assessing what valuations would make for good policy.”103 The court
also noted that Clark’s affidavit discussed irrelevant valuations ranging
from $475, the market price valuation of a Kestrel in Great Britain, to
$50,000, the estimated process to propagate and release a California
Condor.104 The court further took issue with the fact that Clark
subjectively factored in eagle and hawk “scarcity and roles in the
ecosystem” in order to arrive at his final estimated replacement costs.105

Id. at 928-29. As Clark averred:
In considering replacement cost within the context of illegal activity, I
feel strongly that the ultimate determination of that cost should not
inadvertently create an incentive to kill the affected birds rather than to
simply displace or injure them. . . . Therefore, even in the absence of a
comparable market value or propagation cost upon which to base the
replacement value of dead birds, a determination of reasonable
restitution payments can be reached by beginning with the average cost
to properly care for, rehabilitate and release to the wild an individual
bird of the affected species . . . . Then, this cost basis can be adjusted to
account for [other] factors. Id.
103
Id. at 929. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2Q2.1(b)(3)(A) (2015).
104
Bertucci, 795 F.3d at 929.
105
Id.
102
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The court also found that because much of the information used in Clark’s
analyses was derived from decades old, third party conversations which he
may not have been present during, it was impossible to discern how Clark
learned of the information or its reliability.106 The court ruled that Clark’s
valuations did not constitute sufficiently reliable evidence to justify the
increased valuations proffered by the government in this case. 107 Thus, the
court remanded the case for resentencing consistent with its opinion.108
V. COMMENT
According to § 2Q2.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines, “where the
fair-market retail price is difficult to ascertain, the court may make a
reasonable estimate using any reliable information, such as the reasonable
replacement or restitution cost or the acquisition and preservation (e.g.,
taxidermy) cost.”109 Bertucci puts this comment in the Guidelines to the
test in the Eighth Circuit. In this case, the government sought out Edward
E. Clark Jr., co-founder and president of the Wildlife Center of Virginia,
to submit an affidavit on how to properly value the eagle and hawk for

Id.
Id.
108
Id. at 932.
109
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2Q2.1 cmt. n. 4 (2015)(emphasis added).
106
107
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sentencing purposes.110 The Wildlife Center of Virginia is considered one
of the world’s leading teaching and research hospitals for native wildlife
and has treated nearly 60,000 wild animals, representing over 200 species
since its founding in 1982.111 Birds of prey, like those at issue in Bertucci,
represent about 10-15 percent of the hospital’s intake.112
Clark has experience in drafting legislation and regulation
governing the use of natural resources and the use and possession of
wildlife.113 Over the last 24 years, Clark assisted both state and federal law
enforcement in establishing reasonable replacement costs for illegally
taken wildlife, including eagles and other birds of prey. 114 His wildlife
replacement costs in cases involving crimes in violation of the Migratory
Bird Act have been used in Carrolton, Texas; Little Rock, Arkansas; and
in Charlottesville, Virginia.115 He also consulted with nearly a dozen state
wildlife agencies along with congressional and legislative staff on a wide

Bertucci, 794 F.3d at 928.
Affidavit of Edward E. Clark Jr., President, Wildlife Center of Virginia (Oct. 29,
2014) (on file with author).
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Id.
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variety of wildlife and enforcement issues.116 Clark received national
recognition for his work, including: the Chuck Yeager Award from the
National Fish and Wildlife Foundation and designation as one of 500
Environmental Achievers by the U.S. committee for the UN Environment
Programme.117 Additionally, in 2007, the Wildlife Center of Virginia was
named Conservation Organization of the Year for the United States.118
Clark’s affidavit outlined the factors he considered when
determining a reasonable replacement cost of birds of prey protected under
the Migratory Bird Treaty Act: “1) the cost of captive propagation,
conditioning and release to the wild of relevant species, 2) the cost of
treating, rehabilitating and restoring to health, an individual victim of the
type of crime committed (shooting, poisoning, trapping), and 3) the
market value of an individual from the affected species, or similar species,
where a legal commerce in these birds exists.”119 Clark stated “for the
purposes of this affidavit, the replacement value will be the cost to simply
produce or restore an individual bird that can exist as a living,

Id.
Id.
118
Id.
119
Id.
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functioning, wild creature in its normal habitat. No effort is made to
assign or assess the specific value of that animal's role in the
ecosystem.”120
The court criticized Clark’s valuations, in part because he included
“policy” concerns in his valuation process.121 Clark’s experience with
wildlife legislation, as well as his founding and working for the Wildlife
Center, make him a reliable and qualified source, if not more qualified
than the court, to determine these valuations. Accordingly, his policy
considerations are reliable and should be taken seriously. Clark worked
with wildlife in rehabilitating and reintroducing them into their
environments; his policy concerns are those the court should consider in
valuing wildlife. It is difficult to imagine what harm could come from the
court being more inclusive when considering factors to value wildlife.
120
121

Id.(emphasis added).
U.S. v. Bertucci, 794 F.3d 925, 928-29 (8th Cir. 2015). As Clark averred:
In considering replacement cost within the context of illegal activity, I feel
strongly that the ultimate determination of that cost should not inadvertently
create an incentive to kill the affected birds rather than to simply displace or
injure them. . . .
Therefore, even in the absence of a comparable market value or propagation cost
upon which to base the replacement value of dead birds, a determination of
reasonable restitution payments can be reached by beginning with the average
cost to properly care for, rehabilitate and release to the wild an individual bird of
the affected species . . . . Then, this cost basis can be adjusted to account for
[other] factors . . . . Id.

182

Clark emphasizes a very important policy concern that should be
addressed by the court: putting the replacement value of a dead bird below
the value to restore a bird will only encourage defendants to kill the birds
after merely injuring one in an effort to avoid harsher punishment.122 This
policy issue is obvious, but important, and, if not already considered by
the court when making valuation decisions, it should be. Therefore, the
mere fact that Clark discussed policy considerations should not disqualify
his suggestions for valuing the wildlife
Other courts in the United States have found Clark’s valuation
“credible and reliable.”123 In fact, the court in Ross relied solely on Clark’s
valuations.124 The Ross court suggested the entire district had accepted
Clark’s valuations of hawks.125 Further, Clark’s wildlife valuations have
been used in Carrolton, Texas; Little Rock, Arkansas; and in
Charlottesville, Virginia.126 The Eighth Circuit should follow these courts
and use Clark’s expert wildlife valuations.

Id.
See U.S. v. Ross, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146285, at *15 (D.S.D. Oct. 10, 2012).
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Id.
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Id.
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Affidavit of Edward E. Clark Jr., President, Wildlife Center of Virginia (Oct. 29,
2014) (on file with author).
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One of the methods of valuation used by the Eight Circuit, and
demonstrated by the Oehlenschlager court, is logically flawed. In the
Oehlenschlager case, rather than relying on the valuation table prepared
by the United States Fish and Wildlife Service applied in Bertucci,127 or
allowing the valuations to be based on a highly qualified and
knowledgeable expert, the Eighth Circuit relied on the defendant’s
handwritten price list when valuing the illegally imported wildlife.128 It is
counter-intuitive that the court would look to a wildlife offender’s
projected profit to determine how wildlife should be valued. Offenders,
whether buyers or sellers, do not take into consideration the cost to replace
an animal in the environment or the costs to rehabilitate an injured animal
so that it may be re-introduced into its environment. Offenders do not
appreciate the impact that removing an animal will have on the rest of the
environment. It seems obvious that Clark is immensely more qualified and
capable to determine the true value of wildlife than an offender convicted
of a crime against wildlife.

127
128

Bertucci, 794 F.3d at 929.
U.S. v. Oehlenschlager, 76 F.3d 227, 230 (8th Cir. 1996).
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Additionally, the court in Asper found that taxidermists were
capable of determining the replacement valuations of endangered wildlife
based on the cost of acquisition, scientific value, and rarity. 129 After seeing
first-hand what it actually costs to replace or rehabilitate wildlife from his
work at the Wildlife Foundation, surely, Clark’s valuations are more
reliable and more inclusive than a taxidermist’s. Although, the Asper case
dealt with valuing endangered species of wildlife, it is difficult to find a
legal reason that supports the idea that some wildlife crimes are worse
than others just because of the species involved.
I criticize the court in Bertucci for not being more inclusive of
other factors when it comes to the valuations of the eagle and hawk. Using
the wildlife valuation table just for the sake of being consistent
underestimates the true value of wildlife. After reviewing the wildlife
valuation table created by the Department of the Interior’s Fish and
Wildlife Service, it is unclear what factors the Department considered
when creating the valuations. Seeing that the court in Bertucci stands for
the proposition that strict application of the valuation table is required, I
wonder how long the court will consider this table to be accurate. I wonder
129

U.S. v. Asper, 753 F. Supp. 1260, 1281 (M.D. Pa. 1990).
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what will happen in regards to the valuation table if we see significant
inflation or a sudden influx in wildlife related crime. The Bertucci
decision does not answer these questions. Being consistent just for the
sake of being consistent, as the court ruled in Bertucci, underestimates
wildlife value and in turn harms our country’s wildlife.
While the implications of the court’s decision to strictly adhere to
the Wildlife Foundation’s valuation table are not obvious and immediate,
there are concerns that offenders, especially repeat offenders like the
defendant in Bertucci, will continue to harm or take wildlife illegally,
while calculating the risks and future punishments involved with the
crime. The deterrence goal of punishment will not be achieved because
offenders will likely continue to commit crimes against wildlife at a level
that will cover their costs if they are caught by law enforcement,
evidenced by Mr. Bertucci’s pattern of repeated illegal wildlife behavior.
The court should have taken a more inclusive stance and considered
Clark’s exceedingly reliable valuations when determining the values of the
eagle and hawk in Bertucci.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Bertucci represents the proposition that the valuation table created
by the United States Fish and Wildlife Service is the correct method of
valuation in instances where the market value of wildlife is difficult to
ascertain. However, it seems the court only applied this valuation method
for the sake of staying consistent with Mr. Bertucci’s previous conviction
in 2009. In doing so, the court demonstrates how this method of valuation
fails to deter offenders from recommitting the same crimes involving
wildlife. Mr. Bertucci was not deterred by the sentence he received in
2009, which was based on the United States Fish and Wildlife Service
valuation table.

This obvious lack of deterrence is a concerning

implication of the Bertucci case.
The court should have utilized Clark’s expert replacement
valuations, which were based on years of experience working to restore
birds to their natural habitat, and should have been more inclusive in
considering factors when valuing wildlife in order to deter wildlife
offenders from re-offending.
KATIELEE KITCHEN
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